Socrates O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the votes, 474there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.
Polus And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?
Socrates Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.
Polus Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.
Socrates But will you answer?
Polus To be sure, I will-for I am curious to hear what you can have to say.
Socrates Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst?-to do injustice or to suffer?
Polus I should say that suffering was worst.
Socrates And which is the greater disgrace?-Answer.
Polus To do.
Socrates And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
Polus Certainly not.
Socrates I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?
Polus Certainly not.
Socrates Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?
Polus I cannot.
Socrates And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or both?
Polus Yes, I should.
Socrates And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?
Polus I should.
Socrates Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
475Polus I think not.
Socrates And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
Polus To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.
Socrates And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?
Polus Very true.
Socrates And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-must it not be so?
Polus Yes.
Socrates But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
Polus I did.
Socrates Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow?
Polus Of course.
Socrates First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?
Polus No, Socrates; certainly not.
Socrates Then they do not exceed in pain?
Polus No.
Socrates But if not in pain, then not in both?
Polus Certainly not.
Socrates Then they can only exceed in the other?
Polus Yes.
Socrates That is to say, in evil?
Polus True.
Socrates Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
Polus Clearly.
Socrates But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And that is now discovered to be more evil?
Polus True.
Socrates And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say "Yes" or "No" to me.
Polus I should say "No."
Socrates Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
Polus No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
Socrates Then I said truly, Polus that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather, do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.
Polus That is the conclusion.
Socrates You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of thinking; 476but your single assent and witness are enough for me-I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:-You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected when you do wrong?
Polus I should.
Socrates And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and, tell me your opinion.
Polus Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
Socrates Consider again:-Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?
Polus I should say so.
Socrates And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will he struck violently or quickly?
Polus True.
Socrates And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
Polus Truly.
Socrates And if he cuts, the same argument holds-there will be something cut?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
Polus That is evident.
Socrates Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the affection of the agent?
Polus I agree.
Socrates Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?
Polus Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
Socrates And suffering implies an agent?
Polus Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
Socrates And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And therefore he acts justly?
Polus Justly.
Socrates Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
Polus That is evident.
Socrates And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
Polus True.
Socrates And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?477
Polus Certainly.
Socrates Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
Polus That is true.
Socrates Then he is benefited?
Polus Yes.
Socrates Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term "benefited"? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved.
Polus Surely.
Socrates Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:-In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?
Polus There is no greater evil.
Socrates Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?
Polus I should.
Socrates And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?
Polus Of course.
Socrates And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils-injustice, disease, poverty?
Polus True.
Socrates And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?-Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?
Polus By far the most.
Socrates And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
Polus What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by to be most disgraceful?
Polus It has been admitted.
Socrates And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
Polus Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.
Socrates Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.
Polus Clearly.
Socrates And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?
Polus Yes.
Socrates Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils!
Polus That is evident.
Socrates Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?
Polus Very true.
478Socrates And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.
Polus To the physicians, Socrates.
Socrates And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
Polus To the judges, you mean.
Socrates -Who are to punish them?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?
Polus Clearly.
Socrates Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
Polus That is evident.
Socrates Which, then, is the best of these three?
Polus Will you enumerate them?
Socrates Money-making, medicine, and justice.
Polus Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
Socrates And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?
Polus Yes.
Socrates But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?
Polus I think not.
Socrates A useful thing, then?
Polus Yes.
Socrates Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain-that you get well?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?
Polus Clearly he who was never out of health.
Socrates Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.
Polus True.
Socrates And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil-which of them is the most miserable?
Polus Clearly he who is not healed.
Socrates And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?
Polus True.
Socrates And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine of our vice?
Polus True.
Socrates He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.
Polus Clearly.
Socrates And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
Polus True.
Socrates That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?
Polus Yes.
Socrates Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?
Polus Certainly.
479Socrates That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?
Polus True.
Socrates May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:-Is not that a parallel case?
Polus Yes, truly.
Socrates He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
Polus If you please.
Socrates Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?
Polus That is quite clear.
Socrates And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?
Polus True.
Socrates And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
Polus Yes.
Socrates To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
Polus That is true.
Socrates Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.-Was not that what I said?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And it has been proved to be true?
Polus Certainly.
480Socrates Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?
Polus True.
Socrates And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:-is any other inference consistent with them?
Polus To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.
