468Socrates And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:-these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?
Polus Exactly so.
Socrates Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
Polus Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
Socrates When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
Polus Yes.
Socrates And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?
Polus Most true.
Socrates Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?
Polus You are right.
Socrates Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?
Polus Yes.
Socrates But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?
Polus Well, I suppose not.
Socrates Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?
Polus He will not.
Socrates Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
Polus As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!
469Socrates Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
Polus In either case is he not equally to be envied?
Socrates Forbear, Polus!
Polus Why "forbear"?
Socrates Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them.
Polus And are those of whom spoke wretches?
Socrates Yes, certainly they are.
Polus And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
Socrates No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied.
Polus Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
Socrates Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.
Polus At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?
Socrates Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.
Polus How can that be, Socrates?
Socrates That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.
Polus But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
Socrates Certainly not.
Polus Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
Socrates I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.
Polus Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
Socrates Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
Polus I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
Socrates Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power-he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private-but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?
Polus Certainly not such doing as this.
470Socrates But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
Polus I can.
Socrates Why then?
Polus Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.
Socrates And punishment is an evil?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
Polus Yes.
Socrates Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil-what principle do you lay down?
Polus I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.
Socrates Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.
Polus You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?
Socrates Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.
Polus Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.
Socrates What events?
Polus You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?
Socrates At any rate I hear that he is.
Polus And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
Socrates I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.
Polus And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?
Socrates Most certainly not.
Polus Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?
Socrates And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.
Polus What! and does all happiness consist in this?
Socrates Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.
471Polus Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?
Socrates Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
Polus That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!
Socrates I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.
Polus That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.
Socrates Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, 472and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement-you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose-they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort-let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery-that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates But I say that this is an impossibility-here is one point about which we are at issue:-very good. And do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?
Polus Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.
Socrates On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?
Polus Yes.
Socrates But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,-more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods473 and men.
Polus You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.
Socrates I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us-are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
Polus Exactly so.
Socrates And you said the opposite?
Polus Yes.
Socrates I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?
Polus By Zeus, I did.
Socrates In your own opinion, Polus.
Polus Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.
Socrates You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?
Polus Certainly.
Socrates And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable-are you going to refute this proposition also?
Polus A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates.
Socrates Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
Polus What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?
Socrates There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say-"in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant"?
Polus Yes, I did.
Socrates Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other-neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation-when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.
Polus But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.
