It is also through an abuse of language that the emotional state designated by the various names of a sense of the laughable, of the ridiculous, of the comic, is considered as a department of æsthetic emotion, for no other reason, as it seems, than because the comic enters into all the arts and produces a disinterested pleasure. Its domain, however, extends far beyond this. It has been closely studied in the general and special works of Darwin, Piderit, Spencer, L. Dumont, Hecker, Kräpelin, and others; and I do not propose to dwell on it at length, having very little to offer in the way of personal opinion on the subject. Yet this manifestation of the affective life, with its peculiar mode of expression, laughter, cannot be omitted from a complete treatise on the feelings.
This subject presents two aspects, one internal, subjective, psychological, the other external, objective, physiological. The latter presents no difficulties, being susceptible of an exact description; but to connect it with an internal cause, to say why one laughs, is a very difficult problem, which has been solved in various manners. In my opinion the error lies in thinking that laughter has _a cause_. It has very distinct _causes_ which, seemingly, can be reduced no further, or, at least, their unity has not hitherto been discovered. If we were to recount only a few of the numerous definitions of laughter current in books, we should find none that was not in some way open to criticism, because there is none which embraces the question in all its manifold aspects. Thus L. Dumont, in a special work on Laughter, says, “It is an assemblage of muscular movements, corresponding to a feeling of pleasure.” Is the laughter caused by tickling, by cold, or by the ingestion of certain substances, the hysteric laughter alternating with tears, the nervous laughter of soldiers in action, after the moment of danger is over—are all these to be put down to the account of pleasure? Even if we class these and analogous facts by themselves, as purely reflex actions, there still remain difficulties.
1. Considered from the purely psychological point of view, the mental state which shows itself in laughter consists, according to some, in the consciousness of incongruity, of a certain kind of contradiction; according to others, in a consciousness of superiority in relation to men and things on the part of the laugher.
The first view seems to number most adherents. It assumes as a fundamental fact the grasping of a contrast between two perceptions, images, or ideas. Yet all contradictory contrasts do not make us laugh; if they are to do so, they must fulfil certain conditions. In the first place, the two contradictory elements must be given simultaneously as belonging to the same object, so as to induce us to think that a thing both is and is not at the same time. A monkey makes us laugh, because he reminds us of, but is not, a man; he makes us laugh still more if dressed in human clothes, because the contradiction is more striking. Next, the two states of consciousness must be very nearly of the same mass and intensity—a broken-down old man carrying a heavy burden does not make us laugh. “The two contradictory forces brought into play in laughter, being unable to attain to the unity of a conception, are forced to escape outwards by an expenditure of muscular energy” (L. Dumont).
The second theory, first formulated by Hobbes, but perhaps of still earlier date, is as follows: “The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others or with our own formerly.”[222] The partisans of this view have severely criticised the theory of incongruity, or discordance in things. “An instrument out of tune, a fly in ointment, snow in May, Archimedes studying geometry in a siege; ... everything of the nature of disorder; ... and whatever is unnatural; the entire catalogue of the vanities given by Solomon—are all incongruous, but they cause feelings of pain, anger, sadness, loathing, rather than mirth.”[223] This view is quite as open to criticism as the preceding; and we might enumerate a long list of cases where the feeling of superiority, whether justifiable or not, does not make us laugh. In my opinion, both views ought to be admitted, as being partially true, and meeting distinct cases.
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Footnote 222:
Hobbes, _Human Nature_ (2nd ed.), 1650.
Footnote 223:
Bain, _The Emotions_, p. 257.
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The second theory is suited to the primitive and lower form of that emotional state which shows itself in laughter. In the case before us, this state is directly derived from the sense of strength or power, or, as Hobbes calls it, glory; the contradictory contrast, if perceived at all, is in the background. The coarsest and most brutal, almost physiological, expression of this mental state, is the laugh of the savage after a victory, when treading his vanquished enemy under foot.
“It appears to be fairly certain, not only that laughter is a concomitant of brutality and cruelty among uncivilised races, and children, but that even in the cases of the more refined and benevolent, it is apt to accompany the recognition of any slight loss of dignity in another, when this loss does not evoke other and painful feelings.”[224] It is a matter of common observation, that many people have a tendency immediately to burst out laughing at any accident, even if serious, happening to others; and this instinctive laughter certainly does not spring from the good side of human nature. It is clear that, under this form, laughter has nothing to do with æsthetics.
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Footnote 224:
Sully, _Sensation and Intuition_, p. 262; _The Human Mind_, i. p. 148.
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The theory of discord suits well with the secondary and superior forms: the feeling of superiority becomes effaced and passes into the background. It is an intellectualised manifestation, which has or may have an æsthetic value, the mental development permitting those fugitive and subtle contradictions which constitute the principal element of the comic to be caught on the wing. It takes on an almost disinterested character, though never, perhaps, completely losing its original blemish.
Finally, laughter may take a still more elevated form in the humorous spirit we have already mentioned (Part II., Chap V., 3), in which the feeling of superiority is mitigated by a large proportion of sympathy.
2. The nature of laughter would be very incompletely known were we to confine ourselves to pure psychology, but the physiological study of this phenomenon has not been neglected. The description will be found in special works on the expression of the emotions, especially in Darwin (chap. viii.). Laughter is a strengthened expiratory movement; when prolonged, the excess of the expirations over the inspirations necessitates deep sighs in order to restore the equilibrium; there is a drawing back and raising of the corners of the mouth, the eyes become brighter through the quickening of the circulation. According to Darwin, the uninterrupted gradation from violent laughter (which in all human races is accompanied by tears) to moderate laughter, a broad smile and a gentle smile, proves their common nature; but is laughter the complete development of the smile, or the smile a modified form of the noisy laughter of the first period? Evolutionists are, in general, inclined to consider noisy laughter as the primary form, connected with the brutal sense of superiority. Yet the early appearance of the smile in infants, at about two months, while laughter is not observed, as a rule, till the fourth month, seems, on this theory, to contradict the principle that the evolution of the individual reproduces, in an abridged and accelerated form, the evolutionary process of the species. On the other hand, animals do not give us any information on this point. Certain monkeys smile or laugh—_i.e._, the corners of the mouth are drawn back, their eyes become brilliant, and they emit a certain sound approximating to a chuckle (Darwin, Wallace, Mantegazza, etc.).
But the important point is to know why this collection of physiological facts is connected with certain mental dispositions. If laughter were the constant and exclusive expression of joy and pleasure, the answer would be easy; as in addition to this it is sometimes morbid, sometimes futile and simply physiological, the explanation ought to be framed to include all these cases.
Herbert Spencer has proposed one, which, though published some time ago (1863), still remains one of the most satisfactory. In his view[225] laughter is due to a sudden diversion of nervous energy into a new path—an overflow-channel. The excitation of the nervous system existing at any given moment, especially if intense, can only be expended in three ways—either by transmission to some other part of the cerebro-spinal organism, exciting other feelings or thoughts; or by acting on the viscera, the heart, lungs, and digestive organs; or else by producing muscular movements; and, as the nervous discharge, especially if moderate, follows the line of least resistance, and the most easily moved muscles are the first to be shaken, it acts on the vocal organs, on the mouth, and on the face. Laughter is connected with this last line of action.
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Footnote 225:
“Physiology of Laughter,” _Essays_, vol. i. (1883) pp. 194 _et seq._
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It may result from purely physical excitants: tickling, cold, toxic action, sudden relaxation after a long period of constraint.
It may be connected with representations—_i.e._, have a psychical cause. Spencer admits the theory of incongruity, and defines it more precisely. He distinguishes the ascending incongruity, which goes from the less to the greater, and the descending incongruity between the greater and the less. The latter alone provokes laughter. There must be a sudden transition from one intense state of consciousness to one which is much less intense, while forming a complete contrast to it. Thus, while we are listening to a symphony, a sneeze on the part of one of the spectators may make us laugh. During a reconciliation scene, on the stage, between two lovers, after a long estrangement, a goat begins to bleat, and so introduces a comic element. The heightened attention of the first moment is suddenly transferred to a trifling incident which does not supply it with sufficient matter on which to expend itself; the surplus has to find an outlet, and this produces laughter.
The excess of emotion, when it does not give a shock to the whole frame, and is not the result of a contrast, takes another direction—_e.g._, the automatic actions of certain barristers or other public speakers, of the embarrassed schoolboy twisting his pen between his fingers, etc.
Hecker, in a special work, propounds another hypothesis.[226] He connects everything with a typical fact—tickling, which explains the laughter arising from physical, and that arising from mental causes.
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Footnote 226:
_Physiologie und Psychologie des Lachens und des Komischen_ (1873). For criticisms, see Léon Dumont, _Theorie scientifique de la sensibilité_, p. 211; Piderit, _Mimik_, pp. 138 _et seq._
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In tickling, there is, first, the effect produced by each cutaneous sensation: excitement of the vaso-motor and the great sympathetic nerves, dilatation of the pupil, brightness of the eyes, constriction of the vessels, as may be verified experimentally in the application of a mustard plaster or a sudden effusion of hot water. There is another necessary condition: intermittence; for tickling, there must be change in the rate or direction of the movements, or interruption.
The expiration corresponds to the moment of contact, the expiration to that of interruption; in the first case the diaphragm is raised, in the second lowered. To sum up, tickling is an intermittent excitation of the skin producing an intermittent excitement of the vaso-motor nerves and the respiration, and an alternation of pleasurable and uncomfortable states. But what is the use of laughter in this occurrence? Its function is protective, it compensates for the diminished pressure of the blood on the brain; the frequent expirations which compress the thorax, and consequently the heart, the larger vessels and the lungs, prevent the blood-vessels from emptying themselves.
As to intellectually-caused laughter, Hecker, who borrows his psychology from the æsthetician Fischer, and seems to fuse together the two theories of contrast and superiority, traces all manifestations of this kind to the comic. Now, in the comic there are two simultaneous states: one, pleasurable, the sense of our own superiority; the other unpleasant, the contradiction in the object. Hence a rapid alternation of pleasure and pain. The comic is an intermittent impression, which acts like tickling; it is a psychical titillation which, like the other, shows itself in laughter, and for the same cause. Such is Hecker’s theory in its main outlines.
In conclusion, laughter manifests itself in circumstances so numerous and heterogeneous—physical sensations, joy, contrast, surprise, oddity, strangeness, baseness, etc.—that the reduction of all these causes to a single one is very problematical. In spite of all the work devoted to so trivial a matter, the question is far from being completely elucidated.
