[Footnote 47: I borrow this quotation from RENOUVIER, _Le Personnellisme_, p. 263.]
[Footnote 48: _Matière et Mémoire_, p. 3. The author has returned to this point more at length in a communication to the Congrès de Philosophie de Génève, in 1904. See _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_, Nov. 1904, communication from H. BERGSON entitled "Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique." Here is a passage from this article which expresses the same idea: "To say that the image of the surrounding world issues from this image (from the cerebral movement), or that it expresses itself by this image, or that it arises as soon as this image is suggested, or that one gives it to one's self by giving one's self this image, would be to contradict one's self; since these two images, the outer world and the intra-cerebral movement, have been supposed to be of the same nature, and the second image is, by the hypothesis, an infinitesimal part of the field of representation, while the first fills the whole of it."]
[Footnote 49: _Matière et Mémoire_, p. 31]
